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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, states have defined and protected the rights of real prop-
erty owners. While the National Labor Relations Act does not purport to
regulate property rights, activities of employees or labor organizations
sometimes conflict with these rights. Employees and nonemployees alike may
encroach on private property while picketing, patrolling, handbilling, or
distributing literature in futherance of primary economic strikes, member-
ship campaigns, or consumer boycotts. Shopping centers with large park-
ing lots and enclosed malls offer an attractive place for these activities;
business and office complexes add new dimensions to the problem. The clash
between the right to engage in these activities, which the National Labor
Relations Act deliniates, and the rights of the private property owner, which
the states define and protect, has been intense. Recent decisions exemplify
the procedural and substantive difficulties that arise. This Article will review
these cases and examine their impact on state-created property rights and
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on federal pre-emption, based on the National Labor Relations Act, of state
court jurisdiction. This Article concludes that the National Labor Relations
Board erroneously values nonemployee rights above private property rights.
The issues presented in the pre-emption cases have not been resolved,
sometimes leaving the private property owner no remedy by which to en-
force his property rights and sometimes creating situations in which the staies
may freely enforce state laws that diminish private property rights, but may
lose jurisdiction by federal pre-emption to enforce state laws that protect prop-
erty rights.
II. EMPLOYEE RIGHTS, NONEMPLOYEE RIGHTS, AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER THE ACT
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) provides that
"[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist
labor organizations ... and to engage in other protected activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."' Under
section 8(a)(1) of the Act, an employer commits an unfair labor practice if
it "interfere[s] with, restrain[s], or coerce[s] employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7. '2 The National Labor Relations Board
(the Board) and the courts recognize that communication is essential to the
free exercise of organizational rights by employees so that they may "learn
the advantages and disadvantages of organization from others." 3 Unions
deem picketing and handbilling essential to publicizing disputes with
employers, to gaining recognition as bargaining agents, to boycotting
retailers or the sale of a particular product, and to distributing information
to consumers or the general public. 4
Because employers invite or license employees to enter their premises
to perform work, employees rightfully on the property generally do not
trespass on the employer's property when they engage in membership
solicitation, communication, or distribution of literature on the employer's
property.5 If the employer adopts a "no access" rule, striking employees
1. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
2. Id. § 158(a)(1).
3. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543 (1972). See also
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); LeTourneau Co., 54
N.L.R.B. 1253 (1944).
4. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (employee handbilling);
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58 (1964) (handbill-
ing pursuant to product boycott); Local Joint Executive Bd. (Crown Cafeteria),
135 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1962) (recognition picketing); Hod Carriers Local 41 (Calumet
Contractors Ass'n), 133 N.L.R.B. 512 (1961) (area standards picketing). For a
general discussion of picketing for organization and recognition, handbilling, and
consumer picketing, see THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 557-603 (C. Morris ed.
1971).
5. The validity of employer rules concerning solicitation and distribution by
[Vol. 47
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and nonemployees usually have no right to enter the employer's property
because the employer is entitled to the enjoyment of his private property
rights. 6 When privately owned multiple tenant shopping centers or business
complexes are involved, however, recent decisions indicate possible excep-
tions to this general rule.
A. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.
In the 1956 benchmark case of NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 7 the
employer adopted a rule against nonemployee distribution of materials on
company property and enforced the rule when nonemployee union organizers
sought to distribute organizational materials in the parking lot surrounding
the plant. The Board alleged that the rule violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act
because it interfered with the employees' right or that of a potential agent
to engage in organizational activity. The United States Supreme Court
recognized that in certain circumstances nonemployee union organizers may
have a limited right of access to an employer's premises to engage in organiza-
tional solicitation.
The Court reasoned:
[A]n employer may validly post his property against
nonemployee distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts
by the union through other available channels of communication
will enable it to reach the employees with its message and if the
employees on company property is beyond the scope of this Article.
The distinction between employees and nonemployees is "one of substance.
No restriction may be placed on the employees' right to discuss self-organization
among themselves, unless the employer can demonstrate that a restriction is
necessary to maintain production or discipline.... But no such obligation is owed
nonemployee organizers." NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113
(1956). SeealsoEastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); Republic Aviation Corp.
v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
Employees employed in one building do not have a right of access to a separate
building. NLRB v. Visceglia, 498 F.2d 43 (3d Cir. 1974). Off-duty employees have
less rights than on-duty employees, Diamond Shamrock Co. v. NLRB, 443 F.2d
52 (3rd Cir. 1971), and off-duty employees have no greater rights of access than
nonemployees, GTE Lenkurk, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 921 (1973). For these reasons,
employees on strike and picketing are treated as off-duty employees with no rights
of access as irivitees or licensees. Pickets have no right to picket within a place of
business. Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1953).
6. Hutzler Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 630 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1980). When the
retail store also operates a restaurant or cafeteria, however, special problems can
arise with respect to the application of rules prohibiting outsiders from soliciting
in the restaurant. See Montgomery Ward & Co., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 107
L.R.R.M. 1307 (June 22, 1981); Montgomery Ward & Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 369
(1966); Marshall Field & Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 88 (1952), modified, 200 F.2d 375 (7th
Cir. 1953).
7. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
1982]
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employer's notice or order does not discriminate against the union
by allowing other distribution ....
This is not a problem of always open or always closed doors for
union organization on company property.... Accommodation be-
tween the two must be obtained with as little destruction of one as
is consistent with the maintenance of the other. 8
The Court emphasized that the rights involved were not the rights of the
union organizer because the Act grants no rights to nonemployee organizers. 9
Whatever rights the nonemployee has are derivative of the employees' right
to organize effectively. 10 Section 7 does not grant independent statutory rights
to a union or its agents.1 I
The location of the activity and the employer rule prohibiting such ac-
tivity on his property was the focus of the Babcock & Wilcox-type cases, not
the object of the activity, which may have been lawful, even protected, under
the Act. While the employees may have had a right to receive the communica-
tion or literature from nonemployees, the real question was whether this right
could be exercised on the employer's property in the face of his non-
discriminate exercise' 2 of his property right to bar the trespass.
Following Babcock & Wilcox, absent evidence of discriminatory im-
plementation of a no access rule, the right of nonemployees to enter a private
employer's property for organizational activity generally was denied, ex-
cept when unique obstacles prevented nontrespassory methods of com-
munication with the employees. In 1970, one commentator concluded, "In
fact a Union's right of access actually has been upheld only when a substantial
number of the employees reside on company property .... [T]hus, only
in rare cases has union intrusion been held protected under the NLRA."1 3
B. Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.
Based on the limited federal regulation of the location of nonemployee
or labor organization trespass, some state courts exercise their traditional
equity jurisdiction to enjoin trespasses, even though they arose in a labor
8. Id. at 112.
9. Id. at 113.
10. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 206 n.42 (1978).
11. 351 U.S. at 113.
12. If the employer's rule is applied discriminately to permit some communica-
tion or activity, such as that engaged in by charitable or civic organizations, but
to bar union activity, the rule generally is attacked under section 8 as discriminatory
and therefore invalid.
13. Broomfield, Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction Over Concerted Trespassory Union
Activity, 83 HARV. L. REV. 552, 553 (1970) (citing NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's,
Inc., 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967) (resort hotel) and NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber
Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948) (lumber camp)).
[Vol. 47
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dispute.1 4 In Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,15 this exer-
cise of jurisdiction and the issuance of injunctive relief by the state court was
challenged on the basis of interference with first amendment rights under
the Constitution. Nonemployees had picketed peacefully on shopping center
property in the immediate vicinity of a retail store that employed a wholly
nonunion staff. The union members carried signs announcing that the
employees were nonunion and were not receiving union wages or other union
benefits. The Pennsylvania state court issued an injunction confining the
picketing to public areas along the public roads at the outer edges of the shop-
ping center parking lots. 
1 6
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the picketing
was protected under the first and fourteenth amendments of the
Constitution. 17 Citing Marsh v. Alabama,18 the Court found that the .shop-
ping center in Logan Valley was the "functional equivalent" of a business
district. 19 The Court concluded:
It is clear that if the shopping center premises were not privately
owned but instead constituted the business area of a municipality,
which they to a large extent resemble, petitioners could not be barred
from exercising their First Amendment rights there on the sole
ground that title to the property was in the municipality ...
[S]treets, sidewalks, parks and other similar public places are so
historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights
that access to them for the purposes of exercising such rights can-
not constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely.
20
14. See Part III. infra. For cases upholding state court jurisdiction to enjoin
peaceful trespassory activity, see Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 283 Ala. 171, 214
So. 2d 913 (1968), cert. dismissedpercuriam, 397 U.S. 223 (1970); May Dep't Stores
Co. v. Teamsters Local 743, 64 Ill. 2d 153, 355 N.E.2d 7 (1976); People v. Bush,
39 N.Y.2d 529, 349 N.E.2d 832, 384 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1976); Hood v. Stafford, 213
Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964). Contra, Shirley v. Retail Store Employees
Union, 222 Kan. 373, 565 P.2d 585 (1977); Freeman v. Retail Clerks Local 1207,
58 Wash. 2d 426, 363 P.2d 803 (1961).
15. 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (overruled in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976)).
16. 391 U.S. at 311-12.
17. Id. at 325.
18. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In Marsh, aJehovah's Witness distributed literature
on a sidewalk in a company-owned town. When she refused to leave the sidewalk
as requested, she was arrested and convicted of violating a state law that prohibited
remaining on the premises of another after a warning to leave. The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction, holding that the company's ownership of the sidewalk did
not justify the deprivation of first and fourteenth amendment freedoms. Id. at
508-10.
19. 391 U.S. at 316-18.
20. Id. at 315.
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Justice Black, who authored the Court's opinion in Marsh, dissented strongly,
stating that "[t]o hold [that] store owners are compelled by law to supply
picketing areas for pickets to drive store customers away is to create a court-
made law wholly disregarding the constitutional basis on which private
ownership of property rests in this country." 21
The first application of Logan Valley arose in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.22 Lloyd
Corporation operated a shopping center with a strict policy against the
distribution of handbills within the building complex and its malls. When
the respondents entered the mall distributing handbills objecting to the on-
going American military operations in Vietnam, security guards told them
to leave, which they did to avoid arrest. The protesters brought suit in a
federal district court, claiming interference with their first and fourteenth
amendment rights and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Relying
on Logan Valley, the trial court granted the relief sought, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 23
The Supreme Court reversed, and although it did not expressly over-
rule Logan Valley, the Court's analysis in Lloyd demonstrated that the rationale
of Logan Valley was incompatible with the holding in Lloyd. While a major
segment of the Court's opinion in Lloyd was devoted to distinguishing the
two cases, emphasizing the distinction between the handbilling in Lloyd and
the picketing in Logan Valley and noting that the Logan Valley picketers had
no other reasonable opportunity to reach their intended audience, the basic
issue was whether the plaintiffs had a first amendment right to distribute
handbills on the shopping center property, contrary to the shopping center's
policy against all handbilling. The Court concluded that the shopping center
owner had not dedicated his private property to public use to such an ex-
tent that his private property rights gave way to the plaintiffs' first amend-
ment rights.24
Logan Valley was further questioned in Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 25
which involved an organizing compaign by nonemployee organizers on the
parking lot surrounding a free-standing retail store. The Supreme Court
held the Babcock & Wilcox test to be applicable and expressly found that Logan
Valley, on which the Board had relied, was inapplicable. 26 The Court also
defined the narrow scope of the Babcock & Wilcox limitation on property rights:
"In short, the principle of accommodation announced in Babcock is limited
to labor organization campaigns, and the 'yielding' of property rights it may
require is both temporary and minimal.' '27
21. Id. at 332-33 (Black, J., dissenting).
22. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
23. Id. at 552-57.
24. Id. at 569-70.
25. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
26. Id. at 542, 547-48.
27. Id. at 545.
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C. Hudgens v. NLRB
The last vestiges of Logan Valley, at least in a labor relations case, were
swept away in Hudgens v. NLRB.2 8 The balancing test that emerged, however,
may have for a time obscured the general exclusionary rule approved in Bab-
cock & Wilcox and reaffirmed in Central Hardware. In Hudgens, union employees
engaged in peaceful primary picketing in furtherance of their contract
negotiation demands with Butler Shoe Company. The strikers picketed not
only Butler's warehouse, the location of their employment, but also a Butler
retail store located in a shopping center owned by Hudgens. The striking
employees entered the center's enclosed mall and picketed in front of Butler's
shoe store. An agent of the shopping center owner twice informed the strikers
that they could not picket within the mall or on the surrounding parking
lots and threatened them with arrest for trespass if they did not leave. The
union filed unfair labor practice charges against the shopping center owner,
alleging interference with rights protected by section 7 of the Act.2 9
The Board, relying on Logan Valley and Babcock & Wilcox, entered a cease
and desist order against the mall owner, stating that the warehouse employees
enjoyed a first amendment right to picket on the shopping center property
and that the owner's threats of arrest violated section 8(a)(1). The Board
concluded that the pickets were within the scope of the owner's invitation
to the public to do business at the shopping center and, therefore, that it
was immaterial whether alternate means of communicating with the
customers and employees of the Butler store existed. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, employing a hybrid Logan
Valley/Babcock & Wilcox test.30
The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether the rights
of the parties were to be decided under the National Labor Relations Act,
under the first amendment, or under some combination of the two standards.
The Court noted that the constitutional guarantee of free speech was a
guarantee only against abridgement by government and made it clear that
Logan Valley did not survive Lloyd.31 The Court concluded:
[I]f the respondents in the Lloyd case did not have a First Amend-
ment right to enter that shopping center to distribute handbills con-
cerning Vietnam, then the pickets in the present case did not have
a First Amendment right to enter this shopping center for the pur-
pose of advertising their strike against the Butler Shoe Co. 3 2
After stating that the "constitutional guarantee of free expression has no
28. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
29. Id. at 509-10.
30. Hudgens v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 424 U.S. 507
(1976).
31. 424U.S. at 518.
32. Id. at 520-21.
1982]
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part to play in a case such as this," 33 the Court concluded that the standard
was the Babcock & Wilcox "accommodation" of section 7 rights and property
rights" 'with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance
of the other.' "4
The shopping center owner 35 argued that Babcock & Wilcox permitted
only organizational communication, not picketing. Noting possible distinc-
tions between organizational activity and primary picketing in furtherance
of an economic strike, the Court held that the primary responsibility for mak-
ing the accommodation rested with the National Labor Relations Board. 36
The Court noted that "[t]he locus of that accommodation, however, may
fall at differing points along the spectrum depending upon the nature and
strength of the respective § 7 rights and private property rights asserted in
any given context. ' 37 On remand, the Board found that the striking
employees had a section 7 right to engage in lawful primary picketing in the
shopping center mall at the entrance to the Butler retail store, emphasizing
that this was the only entrance to the Butler store and that picketing elsewhere
would not insure that the message sought to be conveyed would reach
customers of Butler. 38
D. Recent Developments: Clashes Between the Board and the Courts of Appeals
Any suggestion that the general rule permitting exclusion of
nonemployees was modified by the Supreme Court's Hudgens restatement
of the Babcock & Wilcox rule seemingly was rejected by the Court in 1978
when it summarized the decisions applying Babcock & Wilcox and reaffirmed
its strength in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters:39
While Babcock indicates that an employer may not always bar
nonemployee union organizers from his property, his right to do so
remains the general rule. To gain access, the union has the burden
of showing that no other reasonable means of communicating its
organizational message to the employees exists or that the employer's
33. Id. at 521.
34. Id. at 522 (quoting NLRB v. Babcock &Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112
(1956)).
35. Section 8(a)(1) prohibitions apply only to "employers." The shopping
center owner contended that he was not an employer subject to section 8 because
he did not employ the striking employees. The Supreme Court stated that "[w]hile
Hudgens was not the employer of the employees involved in this case,... he was
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of §§ 2(6) and (7) of the Act,
29 U.S.C. §5 152(6) and (7) .... [A] statutory 'employer' may violate § 8(a)(1)
with respect to employees other than his own." 424 U.S. at 510 n.3.
36. 424 U.S. at 522.
37. Id.
38. Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414 (1977).
39. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
[Vol. 47
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access rules discriminate against union solicitation. That the burden
imposed on the union is a heavy one is evidenced by the fact that
the balance struck by the Board and the courts under the Babcock
accommodation principle has rarely been in favor of trespassory
organizational activity. 40
Nevertheless, the shopping center cases have caused disagreement be-
tween the Board and the courts, with the office building and industrial park
cases also presenting some difficulties. 4 1 The Board and the courts have
disagreed on what constitutes inaccessibility or whether substantial evidence
supported the Board's conclusions of inaccessibility in the trespass cases.42
In the two recent cases discussed below, the Board has taken a more expan-
sive view of statutory protection than the courts seem willing to accept,
although the rationales of the reviewing courts differ.
In Hutzler Brothers Co. v. NLRB,4 3 nonemployee organizers sought to
distribute handbills at entrances to a free-standing retail store from a lower
level parking lot. When security guards requested the organizers to leave,
the union filed unfair labor practice charges, which were upheld by the Board.
The Board concluded that access, by other means, to the store employees
was so difficult "that only by access to Respondent's property ... [could]
meaning be given to the Section 7 rights of Respondent's employees." 44 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that
the evidence did not support the Board's conclusion that access to store pro-
perty was required by the absence of other reasonable available avenues of
communication.4 5 The court relied on the strong reaffirmation of Babcock
& Wilcox in Sears and held that" [t]he ultimate question.., is not whether
organizational contact of employees is difficult but whether the difficulty can
be reasonably overcome.'"46
In Giant Food Markets, Inc. 47 the Board focused on the effectiveness of
alternate means of communication as well as the strength of the section 7
40. Id. at 205. See also United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 616, 628-29
(D.C. Cir. 1981) for a similar restatement of the rule.
41. For cases involving industrial parks, see, e.g., Eisenberg v. Holland Ran-
tos Co., 583 F.2d 100 (3rd Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Visceglia, 498 F.2d 43 (3rd Cir.
1974). For a case involving an office building, see Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB,
651 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1980).
42. See, e.g., NLRB v. Kutsher's Hotel & Country Club, Inc., 427 F.2d 200
(2d Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Tamiment, Inc., 451 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1012 (1972); Sabine Towing & Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 663 (5th
Cir. 1979).
43. 630 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1980).
44. Hutzler Bros. Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 914, 918 (1979), rev'd, 630 F.2d 1012
(4th Cir. 1980).
45. 630 F.2d at 1017-18.
46. Id. at 1017.
47. 241 N.L.R.B. 727 (1979), enforcement denied, 633 F.2d 18 (6thCir. 1980).
1982]
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rights involved. This case involved area standards picketing and handbill-
ing, rather than the primary economic picketing of Hudgens. As in Babcock
& Wilcox and CentralHardware, nonemployees intruded on the private prop-
erty; in both Babcock & Wilcox and Central Hardware, however, the purpose
was communication pursuant to organizing activities. Thus, in Giant Food
the Board could place the activity involved on the "spectrum" of Hudgens
and distinguish employees engaged in primary economic activity,
nonemployees engaged in organizational activity, and nonemployees en-
gaged in a consumer boycott, as it sought to accommodate the section 7 rights
and the private property rights. Because area standards picketing, certain
publicity boycotts, and primary economic picketing usually are protected
by section 7 if properly conducted, the question presented to the Board in
view of Hudgens was where the locus of the accommodation in this case fell
on the statutory spectrum, based on the relative strengths of these rights.
While area standards picketing generally is intended to benefit and pro-
tect strangers to the employment relationship, the Board emphasized that
it was "this employer which the Union charges is undermining the livelihood
of the represented employees in the area ' 48 and that there was "a strong
possibility in such a situation that such union activity, if successful, would
inure to the benefit of the employer's employees through increased
compensation. "49 Having given such stature to the area standards activ-
ity, the Board considered the intended audience and the "effectiveness of
the communication," using a Logan Valley analysis, albeit disguised by cita-
tion to Hudgens.50 The Board concluded that requiring the nonemployees
to picket off private property at the entrances to the parking lot of the shop-
ping center "would too greatly dilute the Union's message for it to be
meaningful." 51 Based on this slim reed, the Board thus granted to the
nonemployees engaged in area standards picketing greater rights than
nonemployees engaged in organizational activity and the same rights as
employees engaged in primary economic activity.5 2
48. 241 N.L.R.B. at 728 (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 729.
51. Id. Compare the Board's analysis, id., andthe Board's analysis in Hutzler
Bros. Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 914, 915-18 (1979), rev'd, 630 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1980)
with the language of the majority opinion in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 322-23 (1968).
52. In Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 651 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1980), a
case involving primary economic picketing, the court was concerned with the dilu-
tion of the message resulting from confining the picketing to the building entrances
rather than allowing picketing on the 46th floor foyer of the restaurant with which
the union had a dispute. "Restricting picketing to the entrances to the building
would substantially dilute the union's section 7 rights since the effectiveness of a
picket line depends on the location." Id. at 1276. The court concluded that "allow-
ing picketing on the 46th floor permits the union to implement its section 7 rights
effectively... while accommodating the petitioner's private property rights. ... " Id.
[Vol. 47
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The Board's failure in Giant Food to accept the Supreme Court's an-
nouncements is brought into sharper focus as the Board was confronted with
the Supreme Court's strong suggestion in Sears that area standards picketing
may be entitled to less protection than was given to the organizational solicita-
tion of Babcock & Wilcox and the primary economic picketing of Hudgens.53
The Board suggested that the Supreme Court in Sears "did not fully examine
and set forth the differences between such oral solicitation and consumer
picketing and the Union's substantial justification for seeking to maintain
area standards.' 54 Nevertheless, because "the right to organize is at the very
core of the purposes for which the NLRA was enacted,' '5 and primary
economic picketing by employees is an indispensable companion to collec-
tive bargaining, the Board's grant of equal or preferential status to the, at
best, implied right of unions to engage in area standards picketing is dif-
ficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court decisions. 5 6
A review of the cases since Hudgens demonstrates that the Board con-
tinues to misperceive the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, as it did
earlier in its initial decisions in Central Hardware and Hudgens,5 7 and continues
53. In Sears, the Court questioned whether area standards picketing is entitled
to the same protection as organizational solicitation. The Court noted that
the right to organize is at the very core of the purpose for which the NLRA
was enacted. Area-standards picketing, in contrast, has only recently been
recognized.as a § 7 right.... [and] has no... vital link to the employees
located on the employer's property. While such picketing may have a
beneficial effect on the compensation of those employees, the rationale for
protecting area-standards picketing is that a union has a legitimate interest
in protecting the wage standards of its members who are employed by com-
petitors of the picketed employer.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 206 n.42 (1978).
54. 241 N.L.R.B. at 729 n.11.
55. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 206 n.42 (1978). Cf. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492,
499 (1964) (primary economic picketing traditionally a major weapon); Seattle-First
Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 651 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1980) (primary economic
picketing at core of § 7).
56. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted
that the Board's grant of such status to area standards activity "leads to a rather
anomalous conclusion that private property rights may have to yield more often to
the protected right to engage in area standards picketing than to other union activities
for which the law has forged a long-standing protected status." Giant Food Markets,
Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 18, 24 (6th Cir. 1980). Nevertheless, the court did not deny
enforcement for this reason, but rather because it could not find substantial evidence
on the record to support the Board's findings that the message would be diluted if
the activity were confined to the outer edge of the shopping center and that conduct-
ing the activity at that location would also involve neutral employers in the dispute.
Id. at 26.
57. On remand in Hudgens, the Board demonstrated continued allegiance to
1982]
11
Whitacre: Whitacre: Property Rights and Pre-Emption under the National Labor Relations Act
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
to push for an overly expansive view of nonemployee rights at the expense
of property rights.5A8 Statutory analysis may support the right of striking
employees to focus their primary economic weapons on the employer with
whom they have a dispute, even when it is but one tenant among many in
an office building 9 or a shopping center, as in Hudgens. Nevertheless, careful
factual analysis and substantial evidence concerning the lack of other
reasonable means of communication is necessary to justify nonemployee
organizational communication on private property in the shopping center,
office complex, or industrial park. With respect to appeals by nonemployees
not to buy merchandise or not to patronize a particular store-the message
inherent in area standards picketing-and other forms of consumer picketing
and handbilling, Babcock & Wilcox, Central Hardware, and Hudgens require
Logan Valley, emphasizing that "the walkways on the common areas of the Mall
near the Butler Store, although privately owned, are, during business hours, essen-
tially open to the public and.., are the equivalent of sidewalks for the people who
come to the Center." Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414, 417 (1977).
In a recent case involving a retail store that also operated a restaurant, the Board
found Babcock & Wilcox inapplicable, stating that "the Babcock & Wilcox rationale
typically controls in situations where.union organizers use 'private' property to
which the public is not invited in a manner inconsistent with the property's intended
purpose, rather than use of a public restaurant for personal discussion while din-
ing." Montgomery Ward & Co., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 107 L.R.R.M. 1307,
1308-09 (June 22, 1981) (footnote omitted).
58. The rationale of the Board's post-Hudgens holdings in the shopping center
cases is clear. The activity is permitted on the shopping center private property
rather than the outer perimeters of the center because the intended audience first
must be identified for effective communication, which can only be done near the
specific store. This also will avoid involving neutral employers in the dispute. The
flaw in this rationale is that identification is difficult, even near the specific store,
because of the flow of customers to and from that store and others. Also, the Board
has not demonstrated a similar concern for neutral employers in cases arising under
the secondary boycott provisions of the Act, which were designed to insulate neutral
employers from primary activity. See Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. Trades Council, 252
N.L.R.B. 99 (1980), aff'd sub nom. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 108
L.R.R.M. 2729 (4th Cir. Oct. 20, 1981); Pet, Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 96 (1979), en-
forcement denied, 641 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1981).
59. In Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 651 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1980), the
court permitted primary economic picketing on the 46th floor of an office building
in front of the primary employer restaurant and stated:
The right to picket in support of an economic strike is at the core of sec-
tion 7.... Accordingly, unions should be allowed to picket in support of
a strike in an effective manner whenever possible. A different accommoda-
tion might be appropriate if some activity not at the core of sectioi 7, such
as area standards picketing, were at issue.
Id. at 1276. The court concluded that, in order to accomplish the Hudgens accom-
modation of union rights under section 7 and private property rights, the Board
had to revise its order to restrict properly the number of pickets and their behavior
on the 46th floor. Id. at 1277.
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that private property rights prevail. Such appeals are decidedly different from
the communication directed to employees in an organizing campaign. If con-
ducted for substantial periods of time, such publicity campaigns can have
a dramatic impact on business. Thus, the interference is not "temporary
or minimal" under Central Hardware. To paraphrase the Logan Valley dissent
ofJustice Black, whose credentials as an advocate of free speech cannot be
questioned, to hold that store owners or shopping center owners are com-
pelled by law to supply picketing areas for pickets to drive customers away
is to create Board-made law wholly disregarding the constitutional rights
on which private ownership of property rests in this country. 60
III. FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION OF STATE
COURTJURISDICTION IN TRESPASS CASES
When confronted with picketing on their shopping center private prop-
erty, employers may resort, as those in Logan Valley and Giant Food, to a
traditional remedy to end the trespass: the state court injunction. Having
lost the first amendment substantive bar to such suits in Hudgens, defendants
may advance the doctrine of federal pre-emption to bar state court
jurisdiction. 61
A. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County
District Council of Carpenters
Federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction based on the Act stems
from the supremacy clause of the Constitution and the desire to avoid con-
flicts in overlapping federal and state jurisdiction. While the pre-emption
doctrine has had a long and tortuous history,62 the Supreme Court did not
decide whether a state court can enforce local trespass laws against peaceful
picketing in the labor relations context until Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego
County District Council of Carpenters.63
60. See Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308,
327 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
61. See cases cited note 14 supra; Broomfield, supra note 13.
62. Missouri cases have contributed significantly to the development of the
pre-emption doctrine. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Weber, 364 Mo. 573, 265
S.W.2d 325 (1954), rev'd, 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Empire Storage & Ice Co. v.
Giboney, 357 Mo. 671, 210 S.W.2d 55 (En Banc 1948), aff'd, 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
63. 436 U.S. 180 (1978). The Court had left the issue open in Meatcutters
v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957). In Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 283
Ala. 171, 214 So. 2d 913 (1968), cert. dismissed per curiam, 397 U.S. 223 (1970), the
Supreme Court had granted certiorari to review an Alabama state court injunc-
tion against peaceful picketing on private property, but later dismissed certiorari
as improvidently granted. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Harlan, in separate
memoranda, explored the issue of federal pre-emption. See 397 U.S. at 227 (Burger,
C.J., concurring); id. at 229 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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In Sears, the carpenters' union claimed that work at the Sears retail store
should have been performed by men dispatched from the union hall or per-
formed by a contractor who employed carpenters dispatched under the terms
of the union's master labor agreement. When Sears disagreed, the union
picketed on private walkways next to the free-standing building, which was
surrounded by a large parking lot. Sears obtained an injunction in a Califor-
nia state court against the picketing. On appeal, the California Supreme
Court determined that the picketing was either "arguably protected" by
section 7 or "arguably prohibited" by section 8 of the Act and held that state
jurisdiction was thus pre-empted under San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon.64 Caron had held that "[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to
Section 7 or Section 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must
defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board
if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." 6 5
The United States Supreme Court in Sears cited Garmon with approval,
but noted that "the history of the labor pre-emption doctrine in this Court
does not support an approach which sweeps away state court jurisdiction
over conduct traditionally subject to state regulation without careful con-
sideration of the relative impact of such a jurisdictional bar on the various
interests affected.' '66 The Court noted it had allowed state enforcement of
certain laws of general applicability, even though aspects of the challenged
conduct were arguably prohibited by section 8 of the Act, and had upheld
state court jurisdiction over conduct that touches "interests so deeply rooted
in local feeling and responsibility, that in the absence of compelling congres-
sional direction,... [the Court] could not infer that Congress had deprived
the States of the power to act.' '67
The Court in Sears concluded that the only focus of the state court ac-
tion was the location of the picketing and not its object or purpose. Thus,
whether the conduct was arguably prohibited by section 8 of the Act was
not important because "no realistic risk of interference with the Labor
Board's primary jurisdiction to enforce the statutory prohibition against un-
fair labor practices ... [existed. The reasons for pre-emption were] insuffi-
64. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The activity in Sears was arguably protected under
section 7 because it sought to obtain employment for union members and to pro-
test undercutting of established area standards. On the other hand, if the purpose
of the picketing was to gain recognition of the union as the representative of the
workers performing the work, it arguably violated the section 8(b)(7)(C) ban on
recognition picketing. See 436 U.S. at 184.
65. 359 U.S. at 245.
66. 436 U.S. at 188.
67. Id. at 195 (citing 359 U.S. at 244). The Court then ciied state cases in-
volving violence and threats of violence, libel, and the intentional infliction of mental
distress. See 436 U.S. at 195.
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cient to preclude a State from exercising jurisdiction limited to the trespassory
aspects of that activity." 68
Whether the "arguably protected" character of the picketing justified
pre-emption of the state court's jurisdiction involved somewhat different con-
siderations. Nevertheless, the Court found that this character also was in-
sufficient to deprive the state court of jurisdiction, holding that
[a]s long as the union has a fair opportunity to present the pro-
tection issue to the Labor Board, it retains meaningful protection
against the risk of error in the state tribunal. In this case the Union
failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labor Board, and Sears had
no right to invoke that jurisdiction and could not even precipitate
its exercise without resort to self-help. Because the assertion of state
jurisdiction in a case of this kind does not create a significant risk
of prohibition of protected conduct, we are unwilling to presume
that Congress intended the arguably protected character of the
Union's conduct to deprive the... [state] courts of jurisdiction to
entertain Sears' trespass action.69
This implied limitation of the holding to the situation where the union
had not filed unfair labor practice charges sparked a controversy that
prompted Justices Blackmun and Powell to file concurring opinions. Justice
Blackmun would have held that if the union had filed an unfair labor prac-
tice charge, the issue of trespassory picketing could have been brought before
the Board in a timely fashion without the danger of violence. He concluded,
therefore, that the logical corollary of the Court's reasoning is that if the union
does file a charge after the employer asks it to leave the employer's proper-
ty and if the union continues to process the charge expeditiously, "state court
jurisdiction is pre-empted until such time as the General Counsel declines
to issue a complaint or the Board, applying the standards of NLRB v. Bab-
cock & Wilcox Co. . .. , rules against the union and holds the picketing to
be unprotected." 7 0 With respect to this suggestion, Justice Powell sharply
disagreed:
In sum, I do not agree with Mr. Justice Blackmun that the
"logical corollary of the Court's reasoning" in its opinion today is
that state court jurisdiction is pre-empted forthwith upon the filing
of the charge by the union. I would not join the Court's opinion if
I thought it fairly could be read to that effect. 71
A review of the various opinions filed in Sears leads to the conclusion that
the delicate balance of state and federal jurisdiction in this area has not been
resolved decisively. 72
68. 436 U.S. at 198.
69. Id. at 207.
70. Id. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
71. Id. at 214 (Powell, J., concurring).
72. Three Justices dissented, finding that state court jurisdiction was pre-
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If the mere filing of a charge with the Board pre-empts state court
jurisdiction, then "it leaves the employer with a qualified right of exclusion
which it is usually unable to enforce." 73 Under existing procedures, several
weeks may pass before the Board makes an investigative determination that
the employees' section 7 rights outweigh the employer's private property
rights, and a final determination may not come for over a year. 74 This "no
man's land" concerned Chief Justice Burger in his Taggard v. Weinacker's,
Inc. memorandum.7 The superficial application of Gannon's "arguably pro-
tected" label results in a hiatus that Justice White also has criticized on
at least two occasions. 76 Given this recognition of the problems in applying
Garmon when legitimate state claims are asserted and the historical state con-
cern in protecting property rights, the Sears Court should have provided a
more definitive resolution of the pre-emption issue.
Until Sears is revisited, state courts must determine whether substan-
tial federal rights under section 7 arguably outweigh the private property
rights, unless the Board has determined to proceed formally to resolve the
section 7 issue. Only the shopping center and business complex cases and
other unique situations should raise serious questions of pre-emption. In
making this determination of state jurisdiction, the state courts must look
to Babcock & Wilcox. The issue is not whether section 7 protects the activity,
but whether section 7 protects the activity at that location. This, in turn,
demonstrates the need for more definite federal guidelines in the shopping
center and business complex cases.
B. The Missouri Situation: State ex rel. Retail Store Employees
Local 655 v. Black
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District was recently
presented with a pre-emption problem in State ex rel. Retail Store Employees Local
655 v. Black.77 Employees engaged in a primary economic strike against their
employer and picketed a retail store in a shopping center of twenty-four retail
stores. The employees picketed on the sidewalk directly in front of the store
operated by their employer. The employer threatened arrest if the pickets
did not leave the premises. The union filed unfair labor practice charges with
the Board, and the regional director issued a complaint. Meanwhile, the
empted because the activity was arguably protected under section 7. See id. at 214-15
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. Broomfield, supra note 13, at 568-69.
74. The long history of the state and federal litigation in Giant Foods amply
demonstrates the delays involved. Giant Food Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d
18, 20 n.6 (6th Cir. 1980).
75. 397 U.S. 223, 227 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (dismissal of certiorari).
76. See Motor Car Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 325-32 (1971)
(White,J., dissenting); Longshoreman's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397
U.S. 195, 201-02 (1970) (White, J., concurring).
77. 603 S.W.2d 676 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
[Vol. 47
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 23
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss1/23
PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER NLRA
picketing resumed and the employer and shopping center owner filed a peti-
tion in the circuit court for a temporary restraining order against the
picketing. The employer alleged that the picketing obstructed access to the
store. The court issued a restraining order prohibiting picketing on the shop-
ping center property. The union filed a petition with the court of appeals
for a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order. 78
The court of appeals concluded that the state court's jurisdiction was
appropriate to regulate obstruction of access to the property, but that the
portion of the order enjoining all picketing on the plaintiffs' private property
was beyond the circuit court's jurisdiction. 79 The court concluded:
[T]he determination of whether the exigencies of the situation
command that picketing be permitted on the employer's private
property must be made by the NLRB in the first instance .... It
is clear that a decision of this scope is to be made only by the NLRB
and that state court jurisdiction is pre-empted in that regard.8 1
Significantly, on this important point, the court did not cite the Sears analysis
and its various opinions."' As authority for this pre-emption of trespass ac-
tion holding, the court cited Logan Valley, which is at best discredited, if not
overruled; Babcock & Wilcox, which held that as a general rule trespass on
private property is not permitted; and Hudgens, which reversed a Board
holding under Logan Valley that the activity was protected.8 2 Because the
regional director had issued a formal complaint rather than dismissing the
union's unfair labor practice charges and because primary economic
picketing by employees at a shopping center was involved, the Missouri deci-
sion probably is correct. Nevertheless, in this difficult area, the court's opin-
ion should have elaborated more fully on the criteria and rationale underlying
its decision that state jurisdiction was pre-empted.8 3
78. Id. at 678.
79. Id. at 679. The court properly noted that the mere commencement of an
action before the Board does not require this conclusion. Id. at 681. The court also
noted that the doctrine of pre-emption did not affect the state court's jurisdiction
in cases of particular local interest, citing cases involving infliction of emotional
distress, defamation of character, libel, and picket line violence. Id. at 679.
80. Id. at 681.
81. The court did not overlook Sears. It cited Sears earlier in the opinion for
the proposition that the state court did retain jurisdiction to enjoin trespass under
the Garmon line of cases. Id. at 679.
82. Id. at 681.
83. The court's analysis had another flaw. It stated:
We concede that the NLRB may decide that this dispute does not involve
the requisite factors to permit the union to picket on private property, which
would mean that the union's rights would not be infringed by the Circuit
Court's injunction. But enforcement of that decision would still remain
within the realm of the NLRB by a federal district court injunction-not
the state court.
Id. at 681-82. The Board, however, has only limited authority to seek an injunc-
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C. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins
Application of a strict federal pre-emption doctrine also should be
restrained by the holding in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins.Y There, the
Supreme Court upheld a California state court decision that granted the right
to engage in certain publicly expressive activities on private property as a
matter of state constitutional law. The shopping center owner contended
that under federal law individuals have no right to trespass on private prop-
erty, even to exercise their rights of free speech, citing Lloyd. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court held that the enforcement of state laws that diminished
private property rights was not pre-empted by federal law and that the
California state court's decision to protect rights of expression did not in-
fringe on the shopping center owner's federally recognized property rights.85
Because this case did not involve employee rights or union activities
under the National Labor Relations Act, it technically can be squared with
the concept of pre-emption under the labor relations cases. As the history
of the litigation in this area demonstrates, however, the activities of
employees, nonemployees, and others in a labor dispute can involve elements
of free speech. Therefore, the protection of interests involved cannot be so
specifically categorized and segregated. California courts have interpreted
state statutes to permit picketing on private property in a labor relations
dispute and to deprive the state courts of jurisdiction to issue an injunction
in such cases. 86
When read together, Pruneyard and Sears seemingly create the following
dilemma: as a general rule, the states may enforce state laws that limit private
property rights when trespassory activities are involved, but because of federal
pre-emption considerations, the states lose jurisdiction in certain areas to
enforce state laws that protect property rights. To hold that state law may
encumber but not protect private property rights is an anomaly, given the
traditional role of state regulation and state courts in this area and the limited
federal concerns developed from Babcock & Wilcox to Central Hardware.8 7
tion in a federal district court against union activity prohibited by section 8(b)(4)
of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976). The Board does not have authority to
seek an injunction in a federal district court against trespass by a union, leaving
the employer, if the Board finds no violation of section 7, in the "no man's land"
that Chief'Justice Burger, Justice White, and others have decried. See Broomfield,
supra note 13; notes 75 & 76 and accompanying text supra.
84. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
85. Id. at 88.
86. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 25 Cal. 3d 317, 599 P.2d 676, 158 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1979), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 935 (1980); Schwartz-Torrance Ins. Corp. v. Bakery Workers, 61 Cal.
2d 738, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964).
87. In response to any suggestion that the state courts are unsuited to assess
federal statutory rights, it should be noted that the state court trespass case deals
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IV. CONCLUSION
The movement of the population to the suburbs and the concomitant
movement of businesses to suburban shopping centers, industrial parks, and
office parks portends further clashes between private property rights and
labor rights. The National Labor Relations Board's failure to define the rights
and considerations involved under the criteria established by the Supreme
Court, i.e., the Board's erroneous elevation of nonemployee rights over
private property rights, raises difficult problems for property owners, unions,
and employees alike. 8 Lack of definition in the federal pre-emption cases
may leave private property owners no remedy by which to enforce their rights
or, at best, will present difficult problems for state courts when they must
determine the extent of their jurisdiction to protect private property rights.
with the location of the activity, not its object or purpose, which is the thrust of federal
regulation. The Board has demonstrated no special expertise in assessing the
strength of the property rights, and for this reason has had difficulty gaining ac-
ceptance of its assessments in the courts. Moreover, in cases involving the location
of "publicly expressive" activity, the state courts are required to analyze the im-
pact of federal concerns in a number of areas.
88. The Board has not followed suggestions made over 10 years ago that it
develop procedures or processes, possibly by advisory opinions or rulemaking, to
expedite decision-making and thus eliminate the hiatus in federal-state enforcement
of rights in this area. See Broomfield, supra note 13, at 569-76.
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